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Abstract  
Utilization of search engines services is embedded in many people's daily activities. However, 
consumers do not pay for these services, they are financed through sponsored search.  The prevailing 
Generalized Second Price (GSP) auction mechanism, which is used by search engine service 
providers to allocate advertising slots to advertisers, who bid on keywords, only charges advertisers 
for clicks on their ads. Advertisers who seek exposure and do not want consumers to click on their ads,
can manipulate search engines by designing ad content with low click through rates that accumulate 
free exposures.             
This research-in-progress paper presents the motivation behind devising a sponsored search auction 
pricing mechanism that curtails advertisers' exploitation of search engines, resulting in a better 
experience for consumers.   
The paper analyzes the attributes of sponsored search nd shows that the indirect payments by 
consumers do not necessarily lead to market failure, as opposed to other situations where advertisers 
sponsor information goods such as national commercial television broadcasting.  
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Search engines are one of the most utilized online services. This indispensable service has become 
embedded in many daily activities people do, be it work, study, dealing with health issues, shopping or 
leisure (Pew Research Center 2009). Yet, consumers do not pay for using search engine services. The 
business model of search engine service providers like Google, Yahoo, and Microsoft is based on 
sponsored search, i.e., advertisers who seek the attention of consumers pay for placing their text ads, 
in an unobtrusive manner, next to the search results.  
Sponsored search has brought search engine service p oviders billions of dollars in profit (Edelman et 
al. 2007). However, when consumers do not pay directly for services they consume there is a risk of 
market failure (Delong & Froomkin 2000).  An intermediary may be able to implement a scheme that 
benefits all the parties involved: the intermediary (e.g., a search engine service provider), the 
advertisers, and the consumers. This may be achieved by presenting consumers with relevant targeted 
ads. Apart from achieving an efficient market, this is important because irrelevant advertising 
diminishes the value of advertising in general and in the long term it may cause consumers to ignore 
advertisements in a manner similar to the already prevailing phenomenon of "banner blindness" 
(Nielsen & Loranger 2006), which is against the interests of the consumers, the search engines, and 
the advertisers as a whole.    
Search engine service providers use an auction pricing mechanism to allocate advertising slots to 
advertisers who bid on the keywords in queries made by consumers (Battelle 2005, Varian 2009). The 
prevailing auction in sponsored search is the Generaliz d Second Price (GSP) auction (Edelman et al. 
2007), which only charges advertisers for clicks on their ads. The practical implication of this pricing 
scheme is that advertisers do not pay for ads that nobody clicked on.  However, sometimes advertisers 
seek exposure and do not want consumers to click on their ad, e.g., in order to advertise their brand 
name.  Such advertisers may manipulate search engines by designing ad content that is not generally 
relevant to consumers searching for the particular keywords they have bid on, and thus gain free 
exposure.         
The purpose of this study is to devise a sponsored search auction pricing mechanism that eliminates 
the exploitation of search engines from advertisers who manipulate search engine service providers, 
causing them to present irrelevant ads to consumers. In this paper we present the motivation of the 
study. In the next section we explain why sponsored search does not necessarily lead to market failure, 
as opposed to other situations where advertisers sponsor information goods such as national 
commercial television broadcasting. The third section presents the challenges of managing 
heterogeneity in search-advertisers' objectives on ponsored search, and the last section concludes an 
describes our future work.   
2 PERILS OF INDIRECT PAYMENT FOR INFORMATION GOODS 
Consumers' lack of willingness-to-pay for digital goods is a well-known phenomenon (Kauffman & 
Walden 2001, Shapiro & Varian 1999). It is especially hard to charge consumers for online 
information, since many websites provide free, or apparently free, diversified information services; 
e.g., news, interactive online games, and professional advice. Furthermore, people do not distinguish 
between the high production cost of information goods and the very low marginal cost of reproducing 
this information (Rafaeli & Raban 2003), so they may perceive the price of information goods as 
"unfairly high".        
Another issue that has a major influence on pricing information goods is that they do not always 
satisfy the excludability assumption, one of the main ssumptions of market economy (Delong & 
Froomkin 2000). Excludability means that the seller may impose payment for the product or service 
on the consumer and may prevent consumption from thse who do not pay. In certain instances, such 
as radio or non-cable television broadcasting, whoever has an antenna and a radio or a television, set 
may consume the broadcasted information content.  I these situations it is very hard or nearly 
impossible to impose payment. Moreover, information goods usually do not satisfy the rivalry 
assumption and the same item may be consumed by allthose who are interested.         
There are adequate trustworthy mechanisms that enable collecting payments for information goods, 
but usually people are reluctant to pay for them due to the reasons mentioned above.  As such, it may 
be worthwhile for an information goods provider to explore more effective business models.  Since 
direct payment for information goods by those who consume them is hard to accomplish, sponsoring 
the use of information goods may be necessary to enabl  their production and their distribution to 
interested consumers. Sometimes, as is the case of basic academic research, governments pay for these 
information goods by allocating public funds to universities and research institutes. In other occasions, 
such as commercial radio and television broadcasting, advertisers pay for exposing their ads to the 
audience, who consume the information good.  In the context of this study, the latter case is of interest 
because advertisers influence the content of the offered information goods.  
It should be noted that advertisers do not necessarily h ve to be involved in the production of a certain 
program (which may probably be rarely the case), they indirectly control the content simply by 
deciding in which programs they would like their advertisements to appear. The indirect financing 
results in a market failure because programs that attract a small audience, and therefore are not 
attractive for advertisers, are less likely to be produced (Delong & Froomkin 2000).  If this relatively 
small audience, which may sometimes comprise of a few hundred thousand people, could have been 
charged directly for watching the program it would be enough to make the program cost-effective.  
However, since people are used to getting free information goods it is unclear if they would be willing 
to pay for such a program, as they might well choose another free program or online activity that also 
suits their preferences instead.    
Search engines are different from other information g ods such as the radio and television broadcasts 
examples described above.  So sponsored search may not necessarily result in market failure. We will 
explain the unique attributes of the search engine service and the accompanying advertisements. For 
convenience, these attributes will be compared to those of national commercial television broadcasts. 
However, the analysis is not confined to these two specific information goods and they may be 
regarded as representing two types of goods, so the implications of this analysis may be generalized to 
other products with similar attributes.     
There are three main stakeholders concerned with sponsored search: consumers, the search engine 
(broadcaster), and advertisers. Sometimes there is also a fourth group of stakeholders, publishers, who
do not have direct contact with the advertisers.  An example is Google's AdSense service, where the 
search engine also serves as an intermediary between advertisers and publishers. However, in this 
paper, we focus on the main three stakeholders.         
In the case of both search and television broadcasts there is the main content and the accompanying 
ads. The substantial difference between these casesis that the main content of search is determined by 
the individual consumer, who always gets the required content (i.e., objective search results) 
irrespective of whether the specific search results were accompanied by sponsored ads or not. So there 
is no linkage between the content and the advertising revenues that finance it. On the contrary, the 
content of television broadcasts is determined by the networks and is directly influenced by the 
potential advertising revenues of the specific program.    
Unlike national television networks that provide all audience, or sub-groups within this audience (e.g., 
a division based on geographic location), with the same commercials, which are irrelevant to most of 
them, sponsored search enables targeted personalized dv rtisement, tailored to the current interests of 
the individual consumer. This distinction is important because unlike untargeted or broadly targeted 
advertising, targeted advertising can be beneficial to ll of the parties involved. Oestreicher-Singer and 
Sundararajan (2010) empirically examined the impact of Amazon's recommendations to consumers 
who look for a certain item on their website: "Customers who bought this item also bought…", with 
data about the demand and co-purchase networks for over 250,000 books and found that the explicit 
visibility of this co-purchase relationship more than triples the average usual influence that 
complementary products have on each others' demand. There is a growing trend of businesses that 
customize their advertisements and tailor them according to the personal information they have on a 
particular consumer (Johnson 2009).  
Another important distinction between television commercials and sponsored search ads is their level 
of intrusion, and their load on consumers' attention and time (Davenport & Beck 2001). Whereas 
sponsored search ads are presented unobtrusively alongside search results and the consumer may 
choose to read or disregard them, television commercials are imposed on the consumers and waste 
both their attention and time. The various techniques that enable consumers to avoid commercials are 
a major evidence of this nuisance. However, these tchniques are usually effective for asynchronous 
content, e.g., a movie, but do not help when consumers watch live broadcasts, like the news, or sports 
events. Consumers may record news to watch later while skipping commercials but such consumers 
are deprived of the experience of watching events live.    
It is hard to estimate the cognitive load of sponsored search ads on consumers' attention. Currently, 
sponsored search is a major source of revenues for search engine service providers, which generates 
billions of dollars of revenues for them, so it clearly demonstrates that these ads are observed by 
consumers. Moreover, there is some evidence that sponsored search ads that appeared simultaneously 
in the ads section and in the organic search results increased clicks on both (Yang & Ghose 2009). 
However a significant proportion of irrelevant ads may cause consumers to gradually learn to ignore 
search advertising (Nielsen & Loranger 2006). Thus consumers will also disregard relevant ads, shall 
not click on them, advertisers will not get conversion  to their websites, and search engines revenues 
base would be undermined.   
Therefore, it is in the best interest of all the stakeholders that search engine service providers use an 
efficient auction pricing mechanism that promotes rlevant advertising and discourages intentionally 
irrelevant advertising.  
3 THE EXPOSURE MANIPULATION CHALLENGE OF SPONSORED 
SEARCH PRICING SCHEMES    
The purpose of sponsored search pricing schemes is to ensure the efficient allocation of ads to 
advertising slots. From the consumers point of view it means that the displayed ads will be the most 
relevant to their specific query and may provide thm with helpful content. Presenting the most 
relevant ads is also in the best interest of search engines because it increases the chances that 
consumers will click on an ad and that advertisers will pay for clicks.  
Apparently, it would seem that advertisers are also interested in clicks on their ads that direct 
consumers to their website. However, some advertisers may not be interested in clicks, i.e., they have 
a low value per click and a high value for exposure and may manipulate the auction in order to gain 
free exposures. Such manipulation is made possible by the pricing scheme currently used by search 
engines. As the current pricing scheme and its respective allocation takes into consideration, the 
product of the ad click probability and the value reported by the advertiser, advertisers can manipulate 
the auction by creating irrelevant ads or ads with low relevance to the possible keyword search.  In 
practice such manipulation leads to allocations in low slots and to a meaningful reduction in clicks. 
Consequently such advertisers, who their ads are allocated in the low slots, enjoy exposures that are 
essentially free.  
Consider a fictitious example, suppose a well-known chain of baby products whose major share of 
revenues come from store sales is interested in stre gthening its brand name and advertising its new 
line of baby cloths. The vendor bids on tangentially related keywords such as: car seat, baby stroller, 
or baby toys. The search auction mechanism learns a low click-through rate on the specific ad, so the 
baby products chain is unlikely to get the most prominent slots on the webpage.  However, the chain’s 
ad will be displayed and consumers will be exposed to the ad’s content that could read as follows: 
"ABC baby products chain has a new line of baby cloths". In pricing schemes, like GSP, that only 
charge per click, the baby products chain will get fr e exposure. The search engine service provider 
does not get paid and the consumers are flooded with irrelevant information which may divert their 
mind from their current task.  
In the long run, all the stakeholders lose from such manipulations.  If consumers experience many 
incidents of irrelevant advertisements, they will increasingly ignore search advertising, including ads
from vendors genuinely seeking clicks. This will lead to a decrease in search engine service providers’ 
revenues and may lead them to seek more intrusive means of advertising that would be less 
comfortable for consumers. 
The challenge search engines face is how to price the sponsored search auction mechanism such that 
the price matches both the click-seeking advertisers and the exposures-seeking advertisers, or 
alternatively how to price the sponsored search auction mechanism to discourage the exposures-
seeking advertisers from such manipulations.  
4 CONCLUSION AND FUTURE WORK 
Attention is the scarcest resource in the information overload era (Davenport & Beck 2001). Search 
engines service providers receive timely information on consumers’ focus as their queries reveal their
current interest.  Therefore search engines are in the best position to provide consumers with effectiv  
advertising for the benefit of all parties involved; the search engines, advertisers, and consumers. As 
the commonly used sponsored search pricing scheme (Generalized Second Price) only charges 
advertisers for clicks it is susceptible to providing free exposures to impressions-seeking advertisers.  
Such advertisers game the current scheme for free adv rtising by designing ads with content that is 
less relevant to the search queries they target, lowering the chance that a consumer will click on their 
ad. At present these ads represent irrelevant information for the consumer that damages the overall 
performance of the auction. Over the long term thispractice may lead to users increasingly ignoring 
sponsored search ads in a manner similar to the well known banner-blindness phenomenon (Nielsen & 
Loranger 2006).  
The possible solution we investigate eliminates the fre  exposures given to the impressions-seeking 
advertisers and maintains participation positive utility while allowing impressions-seeking advertiser 
to enjoy impressions in sponsored search auctions. As described above, it is often the case that 
impression-seeking advertisers create ads with irrelevant information and damage the overall 
performance of the auction. In some such cases charging those advertisers for their free impressions 
may not be sufficient for search engines and a solution that will drive away such advertises may be 
desired. We further investigate a pricing scheme that motivates impression-seeking advertisers to 
leave the auction entirely. The motivation to leave th  auction can be made possible by allowing the 
click-seekers to achieve a positive utility from participating while the impression-seekers achieve 
negative utility and staying in the auction is no longer a rational strategy for them.  
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